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Abstract
Agri-environmental Schemes (AES) are a central component of the European environ-
mental policy, but few of these schemes have been carefully evaluated and doubts are often
expressed about their effectiveness. We use original data collected from winegrowers who
participated in an AES targeting non-point source pollution from herbicides in 2011 and
2012 in the South region of France. Using the variation in the implementation of the scheme
across time and space and a matching approach, we show that the quantity of herbicides
used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from 38 to 53 percent below what they
would have used without the scheme and this percentage is between 42 to 50 percent in
2012. Further, our results suggest that least demanding AES options are effective in avoid-
ing pollution peaks when weed pressure is high, whereas more demanding AES options
guarantee an overall reduction in herbicide use, even during relatively easy farming years
in which less weed pressure is experienced.
Key words: Payments for Environmental Services, agri-environmental scheme, water qual-
ity, nonpoint source pollution, herbicides, pesticides, treatment effect.
JEL: Q15, Q18, Q25, Q28, Q53.
*Funding for this research was provided by the French Agency for Water and Aquatic Environments (ONEMA)
as part of the 2011 call for projects ’Changer les pratiques agricoles pour preserver les services ecosystemiques’
supporting the implementation of the French National Action plan Ecophyto 2018. Part of the data used in the
study were made available by the French Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture (SSP) via the Se-
cure Data Access Centre (CASD). This research would not have been possible without the full cooperation of the
Regional Directorate for Food, Agriculture and Forestry (DRAAF) and the AES site operators from the Languedoc-
Roussillon region. We are particularly grateful to M. Schill, A. Boscher, M. Comat, J. Druais-Levasseur, C. Garrel, L.
Gaillard, M.D. Gras, P.A. Guérin, L.E. Lecoq, O. Liet, M. Lobre, S. Maret and J. Oustric. We want to thank Marc Voltz
(INRA) for his invaluable comments and suggestions. Funding was also made available by the Scottish Govern-
ment Research Program (RESAS) for the preparation of this manuscript. We also thank seminar participants at the
French National Institute for Agricultural Research, Toulouse School of Economics, the School of Geography and
Sustainable Development of the University of St Andrews and colleagues from the SEGS group who reviewed the
paper at the James Hutton Institute. All remaining errors are obviously our own.
†University of St Andrews, School of Geography and Sustainable Development, St Andrews - United King-
dom; The James Hutton Institute, Social, Economic and Geographical Sciences Group, Dundee - United Kingdom
lk38@st-andrews.ac.uk
‡French National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) and Center for Environmental Economics - Mont-
pellier (CEE-M), Montpellier - France. subervie@supagro.inra.fr
1
1 Introduction
In the mid-1980s, increasing concern over the environmental impact of agriculture led to the
introduction of agri-environmental schemes (AESs) in the European Union. AESs offer pay-
ments to farmers who voluntarily accept to adopt pro-environmental practices, and constitute
a central component of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).1 However, doubts are
often expressed about the effectiveness of these schemes. Indeed, because AESs are voluntary
schemes whose requirements and per-hectare payments are generally uniform for all farmers,
the potential for adverse selection is high (Fraser, 2009; Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013). In
the extreme case in which an AES only attracts farmers who would have behaved the same way
in the absence of payment, the additionality of the AES is nil.
Despite widespread interest and investment in AESs (Uthes and Matzdorf (2013); Udagawa,
Hodge, and Reader (2014)), few schemes have been thoroughly evaluated. Chabé-Ferret and
Subervie (2013) demonstrate the additionality of French AESs that impose strong requirements,
such as the AES subsidizing conversion to organic farming, with large effects. On the contrary,
the authors find that for AESs with modest aims, such as the AES only requiring farmers to
add one crop to the rotation, these additional effects are very limited.. Pufahl and Weiss (2009)
show that, overall, benefiting from AESs may significantly decrease the use of agrochemicals
and increase grassland area in Germany. Arata and Sckokai (2016) consider as well the overall
impact of European AESs on a range of indicators, such as the per hectare expenditures on
fertilizers and crop protection, the share of grassland, and the number of crops grown on the
farm. They find that, overall, AESs affect more heavily the production choices of participants
whose farm income rely on agri-environmental payments by more than five percent. Despite
the increasing literature on the effectiveness of AESs, to the best of our knowledge there are no
studies that evaluate the effectiveness of AESs specifically targeting the use of pesticides. This
article aims at filling this gap.
Contamination by pesticides from agriculture is a source of water quality degradation in
several countries in the European Union according to Eurostat.2 This occurs when pesticides
used in fields are transported by runoff and deposited into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal wa-
ters, and underground sources of drinking water. These pollutants are of increasing concern
because of their potential impacts on the environment, wildlife, and human health. During
the 2007-2014 CAP programming period, AESs have been used in France to fulfill the objectives
of the European Union water framework directive. Therefore, AESs have been implemented
to reduce contamination by pesticides in catchment areas where water quality improvement
has been identified as a priority from 2007. Farmers participating in these AESs commit to re-
duce their use of pesticides for five years in exchange for a predefined annual payment. These
1The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) has been allocated a budget of EUR 96.3 bil-
lion for the period 2007-2013 (20% of the funds dedicated to the CAP), of which EUR 1.8 billion has been allocated
to French AESs. Figures are available on the site of the French Ministry of Agriculture.
2Figures are available on the site Eurostat provided by the European Commission.
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schemes are routinely monitored and evaluated on the basis of participation rates, spatial cov-
erage and budget spending. However, they have received little attention with respect to their
actual impact on agricultural practices. To answer this question, we focus on one emblematic
case study: herbicide use in South of France vineyards.
Of all cropping systems in France, wine growing is the one that uses the pesticides the most,
with an average application of 16 phytosanitary treatments per hectare in 2010 (Agreste, 2012).
Among the pesticides used by winegrowers, herbicides are the most commonly detected in the
ground and surface waters in South of France. Given the extent of winegrowing and its reliance
on herbicides,3 incentivizing winegrowers to reduce their use of herbicides is a major challenge.
This challenge has been addressed by the implementation of an AES called the “territorialized
AES” that includes several options for herbicide use reduction. The objective of the present
study is to estimate the additional effect of these options on the quantity of herbicides used by
winegrowers who entered the scheme in the first four years of its implementation (2010-2013)
in Languedoc-Roussillon, a region in Southern France.
The main concern when evaluating the impact of an AES arises from the fact that partici-
pants in the AES self-select into the scheme given its voluntary nature. To deal with this issue,
we use the variation in the administrative eligibility of farmers to the scheme across time and
space, an identification strategy commonly used in the microeconomic impact analysis liter-
ature (see for example Bruhn (2013), Aker (2010), Jensen (2007), Galiani, Gertler, and Schar-
grodsky (2005)). In practice, we compare the use of herbicides of participants in the AES to
that of non-participants displaying identical observable characteristics and who became par-
ticipants once administratively eligible. We use a matching approach to estimate the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT), i.e. the impact of participating into the AES in 2011 and
2012. Specifically, we estimate the ATT for a given year through a comparison of the average
use of herbicides of participants located on already-approved catchment areas with the aver-
age use of herbicides of, otherwise similar, future-participants located on catchments where
the AES was not yet implemented. For this, we use data on herbicide use collected by local
catchment operators from 153 winegrowers, who represent approximately 76 percent of the to-
tal area under contract in the region in 2013. Our matching procedure is based on a large set of
pre-treatment individual-specific characteristics provided by the French Agricultural Census.
We first evaluate the overall impact of all AES options targeting herbicide use in the region.
We find that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from
38 to 53 percent below what they would have used without the scheme, and from 42 to 50 per-
cent in 2012. All our results are robust to various matching estimators. We moreover perform
a sensitivity test that provides support to our findings. Our results are also robust to the exclu-
sion of participants in the most stringent measure (the organic farming option) which could
have been suspected of driving the overall results. Our findings also hold when focusing on
3Growing wine grapes indeed requires controlling competitive weeds in order to ensure adequate levels of pro-
duction.
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a sub-region of the study area, therefore accounting for spatial heterogeneity. We moreover
evaluate the impact associated with the least stringent measure, which is also the most pop-
ular (the “zero herbicide between the rows” option). Our results show that the impact of this
option alone was statistically significant in 2011 but not in 2012. This suggests that least de-
manding AES options are effective in avoiding pollution peaks when weed pressure is high (as
in 2011), whereas more demanding AES options guarantee an overall reduction in herbicide
use even during relatively easy farming years in which less weed pressure is experienced (as in
2012). The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We first present the scheme under
study and the institutional rules governing the timing of its implementation in Section 2. We
present the data used in Section 3, then the identification strategy in Section 4. Thereafter we
present and discuss the results of the overall scheme evaluation and of one specific option -
the so-called “zero herbicides between the vine rows” in Section 5. This section also provides a
sensitivity analysis and various robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 AES targeting herbicide use
Languedoc-Roussillon contains more vineyards than any other region in France, covering some
236,500 ha and constituting 30 percent of the nation’s vineyards. Two out of every three farms
in the region grow wine grapes (Agreste, 2011). The AES options offered to winegrowers in this
region between 2010 and 2013 focused exclusively on the reduction of herbicides use. These
measures target the most environmentally-sensitive catchments and are implemented by local
operators in 29 catchments in the Languedoc-Roussillon region, most of which exhibit levels of
herbicide residues exceeding the regulatory limit. Figure 1 shows the areas in the Languedoc-
Roussillon region where water quality improvement has been identified as a priority by public
authorities and therefore where farmers were offered to participate in the AES.
This AES relies on 5-year contracts, to which farmers apply voluntarily. The payments of-
fered to participants are the same for all participants and are calculated with the view to com-
pensate any income forgone and additional costs associated with the contracted farming prac-
tices. In practice, the income foregone calculation is based on a national price scale and ac-
counts for an estimate of the increased workforce and equipment hire for alternative practices
to chemical weeding, taking into account reduced spending on herbicides. The payments also
cover the costs of annual on-farm follow-up visits by a certified technician. Farmers are able to
choose one or more of four possible AES options: convert to organic wine growing for 350eper
hectare, eliminate all herbicide use for 243 eper hectare, reduce herbicides use by 40 percent
of the regional standard for 141 eper hectare, and eliminate herbicide use between vine rows
only for 165eper hectare.
It is worth mentioning that AES implementation by local operators in priority areas required
many administrative procedures that ended up delaying the availability of the scheme to farm-
ers in some cases. As a first requirement, a hydro-geological diagnostic had to be established
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for each priority catchment in order to assess its vulnerability and accurately define the limits
of the area targeted by the AES. An official decree then had to approve this delimitation. Next,
a local operator was nominated to design an agri-environmental project based on a second di-
agnostic. This second diagnostic aimed to identify the current farming practices in use at the
catchment in order to best adapt the proposed options to the needs of local farmers. For each
farm sector in the catchment, the AES operator had to choose two options from a national menu
that could be offered to farmers in the catchment. As the last requirement, the final scheme had
to be validated by a regional committee meeting once a year. After this process was complete,
the local operator was then in charge of promoting the AES to farmers. Finally, farmers willing
to participate had to send in an application form by the 15th of May, i.e. 15th of May 2011 for
those who decided to enter the scheme in 2011 and 15th of May 2012 for those who decided to
enter the scheme in 2012..
The time needed to implement these steps was highly heterogeneous between catchment
areas. Consequently, the different areas became eligible to participate in the AES at different
dates. Information we obtained from local operators during the data collection suggest that
the time required for AES implementation was likely related to the nature of the local opera-
tor themselves. In what follows, we make use of this exogenous variation in the timing of the
AES implementation to estimate the impact of farmer’s participation into the scheme on the
quantity of herbicides used.
3 Data
3.1 Sample
Our sample includes a total number of 153 winegrowers who entered the scheme between
2010 and 2013 and who are located in three counties of the Languedoc Roussillon region. Our
database includes 3,630 ha of the 4,802 ha of vineyards engaged in the scheme between 2010
and 2013, or approximately 76 percent4 the total area under contract in the study area in 2013
according to the French Paying Agency.5
Table 1 provides the area under contract in the sample, by AES option and by start year. The
last row indicates that the total area under contract is much larger in 2012 than in other years.
The reason for this is that a large number of territories, some very large, have become eligible to
the AES that year. The last column shows that the most popular option in our sample is the one
requiring elimination of herbicide use between the vine rows only, with no limits on the quan-
tity of herbicides used underneath the vine rows. It represents about 79 percent of the total area
covered by the sample. This proportion is very close to the actual regional take-up, 72 percent
4Data for the remaining 24 percent was not available due to either delays in farms’ annuals diagnostics or un-
readable handwritten documents
5The French Paying Agency is in charge of implementing rural development programmes under the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Figures are available on the site of the Rural Development Observatory.
5
of engaged areas in the region according to the French Paying Agency. In viticulture, the main
alternatives to using herbicides for weed control are mechanical methods such as tillage, man-
aged grass, and mowing. They might be more time-consuming but do not affect yields. How-
ever, mechanized weeding under vine rows requires specific investments, and farmers willing
to reduce their use of herbicides without these further investments usually combine the use of
mechanical alternatives between the rows with chemical weeding underneath the rows. That is
why the most popular option is the one requiring suppressing herbicide use between the vine
rows only.
3.2 Herbicide Use
Every farmer willing to participate in the scheme was required to undergo a diagnosis of his
farm by a certified technician. As part of this diagnosis, information on the quantity of herbi-
cides used during the previous farming season was collected for each plot on the farm. This
appraisal was conducted every year during the entire period of the AES through an annual
follow-up for the enrolled plots. We collected both the initial diagnosis as well as the follow-up
documents held by the catchment operators for most farmers who entered the scheme between
2010 and 2013.
From these data, we were able to calculate the quantity of herbicides used by winegrowers
on the plots under contract, as measured through the Treatment Frequency Index (TFI). This
index represents the number of so-called reference doses of herbicides applied during a farm-
ing year (Pingault et al., 2009). The reference dose is often considered the normal dose, as it
corresponds to the efficient dose of a product for a specific culture and pest:
TFI= treated area
total area
∗ dose used
reference dose
For example, if the reference dose of an herbicide is spread over the entire area of a plot, then
the TFI of the plot equals one. If the herbicide is spread at its reference dose but only under the
vine rows, the TFI of the plot equals one third, because the space between vine rows is roughly
twice as wide as the vine row itself.
Although every participant in the scheme was required to provide detailed information on
the quantity of herbicides used each year to the catchment operator, some follow-up docu-
ments were not available at the time we met the catchment operators. Thus, some observations
are missing in the database. Moreover, even when the follow-up document was available, we
were not able to calculate the quantity of herbicides used in some cases because the informa-
tion was incomplete. In the end, we were able to construct the TFI in 2011 for 123 winegrowers
who had entered the scheme between 2010 and 2012, and the TFI in 2012 for 138 winegrowers
who had entered the scheme between 2010 and 2013.6 Note that our sample does not include
6We also obtained data on the quantity of herbicides used in 2010 for farmers who entered the scheme in 2010
or 2011, and data on the quantity of herbicides used in 2013 for some farmers who entered the scheme between
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farmers who never participated in the AES. This is simply because data about these practices are
available only if the farmer participate into the AESs. Indeed, the quantity of herbicides used by
winegrowers is private data, and even if most winegrowers keep records of the treatments they
apply, they are under no legal obligation to provide this information unless they participate in
AESs.
3.3 Winegrowers’ characteristics
We then matched the herbicide use data to the French Agricultural Census that was conducted
in 2010 by the Department of Statistics of the French Ministry of Agriculture on the basis of a
common identifier (the farm business identification number). This census contains a detailed
description of every French farmer during the farming year 2009-2010, i.e. before the first wave
of participation in the AES. The French Agricultural Census provides a range of characteristics
likely to influence the decision to enter an AES, which includes: agricultural education, agri-
cultural training, general education, spouse’s main activity, vineyard surface area in hectares
and as a share of the Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA), on-farm labour (in annual work units),
production (in hectoliters per hectare), production under protected designation of origin (as
a share of the UAA), vinification in particular cellar (as a share of the production), Protected
Denomination of Origin (as a share of the production), irrigated land (as a share of the UAA),
ownership (as a share of the UAA), the average topographic slope of the municipality where the
farm is located, and the proportion of UAA cultivated without herbicides. We provide mean
values of these variables for each group selected in the impact analysis thereafter (see Tables 2
and 5 in Section 5.1), and use these variables as covariates in all matching procedures below.
4 Identification Strategy
4.1 Parameter of interest
The parameter we aim to estimate is the average causal effect of the AES on the amount of
herbicides used by winegrowers who actually participated in the AES, the so-called Average
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT):
ATT= E [Y 1−Y 0|AES= 1]= E(Y 1|AES= 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
observable
−E(Y 0|AES= 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
unobservable
(1)
where Y 1 is the TFI in the presence of the AES,Y 0 is the TFI in the absence of the scheme and
AES is the treatment variable, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the winegrower is par-
ticipating to the scheme and 0 otherwise. The average level of herbicide that would have been
2010 and 2013, but the resulting sample size and the proportion of farmers who can be considered as treated in
our framework are too small to allow us to estimate the impact of the AES in 2010 or 2013.
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used by participants, had they not participated in the AES, E(Y 0|AES= 1), is unobservable to us.
This is the standard problem of causal inference, that is addressed by the matching procedure.
For this, we exploit the exogenous variation in the implementation of the scheme across
time and space, as described in Section 2, and a matching approach to create a control group
from which to estimate E(Y 0|AES = 1). Non-participants who ultimately became participants
are good candidates because data about their use of herbicides, collected one year before they
entered the scheme, is available and because they are likely to have similar characteristics to
early participants. Take the example of the AES impact in 2011, which is defined as follows:
ATT2011 = E(Y12011|AES2011 = 1,X )−E(Y02011|AES2011 = 0,AES2012 = 1,X ) (2)
where X is a vector of pre-treatment observable factors. The estimator implied by Equation 2
is simply the difference between two sample means: the average amount of herbicides used
by winegrowers who were participants in 2011 and the average amount of herbicides used in
2011 by their matched counterparts, similar in terms of X , but who had to wait until 2012 to
participate in the AES.7
For the identification of the ATT to be valid, we must make a second assumption, known
as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which requires that the treatment
received by a subject does not alter the outcome for other subjects (Rubin, 1978). The SUTVA
fails if, for example, the quantity of herbicides used by farmers in late approved catchments
has been influenced by the implementation of the scheme in early approved catchments. If
the group of winegrowers participating in the scheme in later-approved catchments has indeed
reduced its average use of herbicides by anticipation of the AES, then using them as a control
group would lead to underestimation of the impact of the scheme on early participants. In that
case, we would measure the minimum impact of the scheme. Notice however that it is very
unlikely that farmers begin to reduce herbicide use more than one year before the launch of the
scheme on the catchment area where they are located.
4.2 Estimators
We use matching estimators, which address the selection bias caused by observable charac-
teristics by comparing the TFI of current participants with those of observationally-identical
matched future-participants. More specifically, we use the nearest-neighbor matching estima-
tor (Abadie et al., 2004), and the kernel-based matching estimator (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003).
7Similarly, the AES impact in 2012, ATT2012, can be written as follows:
ATT2012 = E(Y12012|AES2012 = 1,X )−E(Y02012|AES2012 = 0,AES2013 = 1,X ) (3)
The estimator implied by Equation 3 is the difference between the average amount of herbicides used by wine-
growers who were participants in 2012 and the average amount of herbicides used in 2012 by their matched coun-
terparts, similar in terms of X , but who had to wait until 2013 to participate in the AES.
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The general form of the matching estimator is:
E(y1− y0|AES= 1)= 1
n1
∑
i∈I1∩SP
(
y1i −E(y0i |AES= 1,Xi )
)
(4)
with
E(y0i |AES= 1,Xi )=
∑
j∈I0
λi j y
0
j (5)
where I1 denotes the group of treated farmers, I0 denotes the group of untreated farmers, n1 is
the number of treated farmers in I1. SP denotes the common support, or the subset of treated
farmers for whom the density of observationally identical untreated farmers is higher than
some cut-off level (Todd, 2008). Matching estimators differ in how matched untreated farm-
ers are selected through the matching procedure. This difference is driven by the weights λi j
that we assign to potential matches given their characteristics X .
It is important that the covariates X used for the matching procedure are not affected by
the treatment (Imbens, 2004), which is why we utilize 2009 values from the French Agricultural
Census. Moreover, we also apply the matching procedure to the summary statistic Pr(AESi =
1|Xi ), also called the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).8
The nearest-neighbor matching estimator used in the analysis matches each treated farmer
to the closest untreated farmer or the two closest untreated farmers according to the vector
X .9 Following Abadie et al. (2004), the matching procedure allows individual observations to be
used as a match more than once. Compared with matching without replacement, this method
generally lowers the bias but increases the variance. With kernel matching estimator, all un-
treated farmers are matched to each treated farmer, with the closest matches having a large
value for λ and the most distant matches having a close-to-zero value for λ.
We use the asymptotically-consistent estimator of the variance of the nearest-neighbour
matching estimator allowing for heteroskedastic errors provided by Abadie and Imbens (2006),
and we implement a bootstrap procedure of 500 repetitions in order to generate an estimator
of the variance of the kernel matching estimator.
Finally, we generate an estimate of the ATT by running Ordinary Least Squares regression
(OLS) of the TFI on the treatment variable AES, controlling for the pre-treatment variables X .
In addition to the assumption of linearity, this requires us to assume that the gain associated
with the AES is constant across X , meaning that the impact of the program is the same for all
informed farmers. Note that the matching approach outperforms the OLS since it does not
8Matching on the set of observed covariates X thus means that we look at the smallest distance between two
vectors X , while matching on the propensity score means that we look at the smallest distance between two values
of propensity score.
9Austin (2010) recommends that, in most settings, researchers match either one or two untreated subjects to
each treated subject when using propensity-score matching. In the case of propensity score matching, pairs of
treated and untreated subjects may be formed so that propensity scores differ by at most a pre-specified amount,
the caliper width. In our case it appeared that the choice of caliper width had a negligible impact on the estimates
so we decided not to use any caliper.
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require specifying the functional form of the outcome equation and relaxes the assumption of
constant additive treatment effects across individuals. We run OLS regressions as a robustness
check only.
4.3 Matching procedure
To estimate the ATT effect in 2011, we apply the matching procedure to the group of farmers
who entered the scheme in 2010 (considered as treated farmers in 2011) using farmers who
entered the scheme in 2011 or 2012 as untreated farmers in 2011. As explained before, farmers
willing to participate in the AES have to send in an application form by May. Given that it is
common practice to apply herbicides on vineyards well before May, it is reasonable to question
whether farmers who entered the AES in year 2011 should actually be considered as treated or
as untreated in year 2011 in the analysis. To check this, we compare the 2011 mean value of the
TFI in the subgroup of farmers who entered the AES in May 2011 to the 2011 mean value of the
TFI in the subgroup of farmers who entered in May 2012. The results show that the TFI does not
differ significantly across groups. We conclude that farmers who entered the AES in year 2011
did not change their practices before the contract is signed and can be considered as untreated
in year 2011.
Conditional probabilities for participating in the scheme (or propensity scores) are com-
puted by estimating a probit model which includes all of the aforementioned covariates X , and
where the dependent variable takes on the value of one if the farmer participated in the AES at
least one year between 2010 and 2013 and zero if he never joined the scheme. To estimate this
model, we thus add to the database a subset of winegrowers who were eligible for the AES but
who decided not to participate in the scheme. We select a subset of those eligible farmers by
taking all farmers located in the municipalities where a participant can be found. Those farm-
ers had the opportunity to enter the scheme but intentionally decided not to do it, which make
them very different from participants and thus constitute a relevant group for the prediction
of the probability of being participant.10 Given the estimates from the probit model, we then
compute the propensity scores for the subset of farmers who will be used in the impact analy-
sis (participants and future participants). Figure 2 indeed shows that densities in both groups
are high enough for a wide range of propensity scores, meaning that the matching procedure is
likely to perform well.
We then compare the extent of balancing between the two groups before and after the
matching procedure. We calculate the normalized differences in covariate means between
treated farmers and untreated farmers, before and after matching. The normalized difference
10Never-participants are useful only to compute propensity scores of current and future participants. Indeed,
computing propensity scores requires a sample including not only individuals with a high chance of participat-
ing (i.e. farmers who will participate at some point in time) and individuals with a low chance of participating
given their 2009-characteristics (i.e. farmers who will never participate). Never-participants are too different from
current and future participants to be taken as a valid control group, even after conditioning on pre-treatment
characteristics.
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is the difference in means between the two groups considered divided by the square root of
the sum of variances for both groups, and is the most commonly accepted diagnostic used
to assess covariate balance (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985; Stuart, 2010; Alix-Garcia, Sims, and
Yañez-Pagans, 2015; Jayachandran et al., 2017). Table 2 displays the results. In almost all cases,
the sample differences in the raw data (Column. 4) exceed those after matching (Column. 5).
Moreover, all the normalized differences after matching are below the suggested rule of thumb
of 0.25 standard deviations (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), except the variable measuring age
with a difference of 0.27 standard deviations. We conclude that the process of matching cre-
ates a high degree of balance between the treatment and control samples that are used in the
estimation procedure.
We follow exactly the same procedure to estimate the impact of the AES in 2012. Specifically,
we apply the matching procedure to the group of farmers who entered the scheme in 2010 or
2011 (considered as treated farmers in 2012) and the group who entered the scheme in 2012 or
2013 (considered as untreated in 2012). As for the ATT2011, we compute the propensity scores
and find that densities in both groups are high enough for a wide range of propensity scores
(Figure 3). We then calculate the normalized differences in covariate means between treated
farmers and untreated farmers, before and after matching (see Table 5) and find that almost
all the normalized differences after matching are below the suggested rule of thumb of 0.25
standard deviations (except the variable measuring age and the variable measuring the use of
particular cellars but these differences remain small). We conclude again that the matching
procedure performs well in eliminating potential sources of bias.
5 Results
5.1 Impact of the AES in 2011 and 2012
The first column of Table 3 gives the estimated ATT in 2011 from the matching estimators and
the OLS regression. The results appear remarkably stable, with a negative difference in TFI
between treated and control groups of −0.29 points using the smallest significant impact es-
timator, which is the one-nearest-neighbour estimator based on vector X , and −0.54 points
using the largest significant impact estimator, which is the propensity score one-nearest neigh-
bour matching estimator. Taking the smallest ATT and given that the average TFI equals 0.48 in
the treated group, it means that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in
2011 would have been 0.77 (0.48+0.29) in the absence of the AES. Put differently, the quantity of
herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 is about 38 percent (0.29/0.77) below the
quantity that would have been used without the scheme. Taking the largest impact estimator,
it is about 53 percent.
We test the sensitivity of our findings by using an approach that determines how strongly an
unmeasured variable must influence the selection process in order to undermine the results of
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the matching analysis (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004; Rosenbaum, 2002). This test assumes that two
farmers with the same observed characteristics may differ in the odds of participating in the AES
by at most a factor of Γ, referred to as unobserved bias. We search the critical levels of Γ at which
the estimated ATT would become insignificant (at a 5 percent significance level). The results
are displayed in first column of Table 4. It indicates that, depending on the matching estimator
considered, the critical value for Γ ranges between 1.4 and 4 for the estimates of ATT2011. Taking
the smallest value found for Γ (1.4), this means that two farmers who have the same observable
characteristics X would have to differ in their odds of scheme participation by a factor of 1.4
for the ATT2011 estimated with the matching procedure to become insignificant. We can thus
conclude that, even though unobservable factors may explain part of being a participant in the
AES, it is very unlikely that they would influence the odds of participation to such a large extent.
We are thus confident that our identification strategy performs well.
Estimates of the impact of the AES in 2012 are displayed in the second column of Table 3.
The estimated ATT range between −0.33 and −0.46 points. Taking the smallest impact estima-
tor, which is the kernel matching estimator and given that the average TFI equals 0.45 in the
treated group, it means that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in
2012 would have been 0.78 (0.45+0.33) in the absence of the AES. Put differently, the quantity
of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2012 is about 42 percent (0.33/0.78) below
the quantity that would have been used without the scheme. Taking the largest impact estima-
tor, it is about 50 percent.
5.2 Impact of the “zero herbicide between the rows” option
Next, we turn to the impact analysis of one specific option of the AES, the so-called “zero her-
bicide between the rows” option, for which the sample size is large enough to allow specific
investigation (81 farmers in 2011 and 92 farmers in 2012). This option is interesting because
it is both the most frequently chosen as well as the least stringent among the options that tar-
get herbicide use - characteristics which are probably related. Indeed, although participants
commit to use no herbicides between the rows, they have no constraints on the quantity of
herbicides used underneath the rows.
Results of the estimates are displayed in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. In 2011, the average
TFI in the treated group ranges between 0.23 and 0.41 points below the average TFI in the con-
trol group. Given that the average TFI equals 0.70 in the treated group, this indicates that the
quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in this specific AES in 2011 ranges
between 25 percent (0.23/(0.70+ 0.23)) and 37 percent (0.41/(0.70+ 0.41)) below the quantity
that would have been used without the scheme. This is consistent with what could be expected
for this measure, given that farmers who commit to not applying herbicides between vine rows
are expected to reduce the quantity used by two third, as the space between vine rows is roughly
twice as wide as the vine row.
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The story is very different in 2012, as the ATT does not appear statistically different from zero
(Column 4 of Table 3). Indeed, as the mean TFI in the control group approaches the mean TFI in
the treated group in 2012 (0.79), the impact of the AES on herbicide use becomes statistically nil.
These results are in line with rainfall data for the years under study, which indicates higher weed
pressure in 2011 than in 2012 due to higher rainfall in 2011 than in 2012. Indeed, the cumulative
annual rainfall in the Languedoc-Roussillon region in 2011 was 955 mm while it was 724 mm
only in 2012 according to Météo France.11 Altogether, these findings suggest that the impact of
this specific AES is weaker when weed pressure is low. In the particularly dry years, like in 2012,
participants in this measure would have used approximately the same quantity of herbicides
without any payment.
5.3 Robustness checks
As stressed just before, the quantity of herbicides used is expected to be higher during rainy
years than during dry years, all other determinants being equal, because of the higher weed
pressure that rainfall generates. One concern with our main findings is thus that estimates are
driven by geographical differences across areas. Indeed, when comparing average levels of TFI
among participants and future participants, to some extent we compare farmers located in the
eastern zone of the region under study to farmers located in the western zone.
In order to avoid potential bias in the estimate of the impact of the AES that could arise due
to spatial variability in meteorological characteristics of the study region, we thus perform the
estimations by focusing on the subset of farmers located in the Eastern area of the region, who
are very close to each other geographically and who constitute a large enough sample to ensure
accurate results.12 In doing so, the sample size falls to 89 farmers in 2011 and 94 farmers in 2012.
Results of the estimates of ATT2011 and ATT2012 are displayed in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.
They appear very similar to those obtained from the initial sample in 2011, with an impact on
participants ranging between 49 and 55 percent below the counterfactual TFI in 2011, while
they appear slightly smaller in 2012 with an impact ranging between 31 percent and 40 percent
in 2012. We conclude that the data we use from western areas do not bias the estimates in 2011.
On the contrary, they may slightly pull the estimated impact downwards in 2012.
Finally, we run the same estimations on a sample in which farmers who engaged in organic
farming schemes are excluded because we suspect that they may drive previous estimates. Re-
sults are displayed in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6. They appear very similar to those obtained
from the initial sample in 2011, with an impact on participants ranging between 42 and 54 per-
cent below the counterfactual level of TFI. On the contrary, they appear slightly smaller than
11Figures are available on the site of Météo France
12Further East, in Gard county, are the territories of Malaven, Camp de Cesar, and Briancon. Farmers in these
areas are not separated by more than 40 km. We were not able to add the geographical location of farmers in the
matching procedure as an additional covariate because the control group lacks farmers located in the western
area of the region. Consequently we are not able to match treated farmers to untreated farmers both leaving in the
Western area, the matching procedure would fail to find good matches in this area.
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those obtained from the initial sample in 2012, with an impact ranging between 26 percent and
34 percent only. This suggests that the small number of farmers who were engaged in organic
farming schemes may, at least partly, drive the main result we estimated in 2012.
6 Conclusions
The main results of our analysis suggest that the AES options targeting the reduction of her-
bicide use in French vineyards had a significant impact on participants’ practices. We show
that the quantity of herbicides used by participants in the scheme in 2011 ranges from 38 to
53 percent below what they would have used without the scheme, and 42 to 50 percent in 2012.
Overall, these results are robust to various estimators, robustness checks, and a sensitivity anal-
ysis.
We moreover show that the least demanding but most adopted AES option - “zero herbicide
between the vine rows” - has a significant impact on herbicide use in 2011, but no significant
impact in 2012. This suggests that least demanding AES options are effective in avoiding pol-
lution peaks when weed pressure is high (as in 2011), whereas more demanding AES options
guarantee an overall reduction in herbicide use even during easy farming years in which less
weed pressure is experienced (as in 2012). This however also suggests the presence of windfall
effects when weed pressure is low, which tend to decrease the efficiency of the program by using
resources to pay for practices that would have been adopted anyway.
Though additional work is necessary to measure the impact of the scheme on overall water
quality within the affected watersheds, our analysis constitutes a first step in this direction by
measuring the impact of the schemes on farmers’ use of herbicides at the field level. Obviously,
measuring the effect of the scheme on water quality would require scaling-up our results to the
farm and then watershed levels, coupling our analysis with hydro-ecological models. At this
scale the actual impact of the scheme on water quality would largely depend on participation
rates, the location of participants in the watershed, physical characteristics of the enrolled plots
(slope, runoff rate) and other sources of nonpoint source pollution in the watershed.
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7 Tables
Table 1: Area enrolled in the scheme included in the sample, by AES option and by start year
(ha)
AES 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total %
phyto02 92.1 2.9 12.4 41.1 148.6 4
phyto04 176.4 3.5 0.0 0.0 179.9 5
phyto10 562.9 272.3 1840.8 197.7 2873.7 79
couver03 0.0 0.0 17.8 0.0 17.8 0
bioconv 119.1 149.2 103.7 0.0 372.0 10
biomaint 0.0 0.0 37.7 0.0 37.7 1
Total 950.5 427.9 2012.4 238.9 3629.7 100
Note: AES phyto02 refers to the suppression of herbicide use; AES
phyto04 refers to the reduction in herbicides use by 40% of the re-
gional standard; AES phyto10 refers to the suppression of herbicide
use between the vine rows; AES couver03 refers to maintaining grass
under-the-row; AES bioconv (resp. biomaint) refers to the conversion
to (resp. maintaining of) organic wine growing.
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Table 3: Average Treatment Effects
All options Between-the-rows
Estimator 2011 2012 2011 2012
One Nearest Neighbour (X) -0.29 ** -0.34 ** -0.41 *** -0.09
0.11 0.16 0.15 0.18
One Nearest Neighbour (pscore) -0.54 *** -0.39 *** -0.26 * -0.07
0.16 0.12 0.14 0.11
Two Nearest Neighbours (X) -0.43 *** -0.46 *** -0.37 ** -0.18
0.10 0.12 0.18 0.16
Two Nearest Neighbours (pscore) -0.50 *** -0.35 *** -0.23 ** -0.05
0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09
Kernel regression -0.48 *** -0.33 *** -0.31 ** -0.08
0.10 0.09 0.13 0.09
OLS (X) -0.43 *** -0.33 *** -0.32 *** -0.25 *
0.11 0.13 0.10 0.14
Average TFI in treated group 0.48 0.45 0.70 0.79
Note: Three asterisks *** (resp. **, *) denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no impact at the
1% (resp. 5%, 10%) significance level. One (resp. two) Nearest Neighbour (X) refers to the nearest
neighbor estimator using one (resp. two) matched observations and the vector X. Standard errors
in italics below coefficients.
Table 4: Magnitude of the unobserved bias for a 5% significance level
Magnitude of Γ
Estimator 2011 2012
One Nearest Neighbour (X) 1.4 1.9
One Nearest Neighbour (pscore) 2.9 1.9
Two Nearest Neighbours (X) 2.6 2.6
Two Nearest Neighbours (pscore) 3 2
Kernel regression 4 2.7
This tables gives the magnitude of the unobserved
bias (Γ) that would explain the estimated ATT in
2011 and 2012, using various estimators. The mag-
nitude of γ was computed using the procedure pro-
vided by DiPrete and Gangl (2004) based on the ap-
proach of Rosenbaum (2002).
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Table 6: Average Treatment Effects – Robustness checks
Excluding western area Excluding organic farmers
Estimator 2011 2012 2011 2012
One Nearest Neighbour (X) -0.59 *** -0.26 -0.40 *** -0.19
0.12 0.20 0.13 0.14
One Nearest Neighbour (pscore) -0.62 *** -0.23 * -0.65 *** -0.31 **
0.17 0.14 0.15 0.12
Two Nearest Neighbours (X) -0.57 *** -0.34 ** -0.45 *** -0.27 **
0.13 0.14 0.10 0.13
Two Nearest Neighbours (pscore) -0.58 *** -0.26 ** -0.54 *** -0.22 **
0.12 0.11 0.12 0.10
Kernel regression -0.57 *** -0.31 *** -0.50 *** -0.22 **
0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09
OLS (X) -0.49 *** -0.34 *** -0.52 *** -0.32 **
0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13
Average TFI in treated group 0.50 0.52 0.55 0.62
Note: Three asterisks *** (resp. **, *) denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no impact at the 1% (resp.
5%, 10%) significance level. One (resp. two) Nearest Neighbour (X) refers to the nearest neighbor estimator
using one (resp. two) matched observations and the vector X. Standard errors in italics below coefficients.
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8 Figures
Figure 1: Location of surveyed farmers
Figure 2: Density of propensity scores by group - ATT in 2011 (all options)
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Figure 3: Density of propensity scores by group - ATT in 2012 (all options)
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